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Abstract
Rhetoric and mathematics have often been cast as opposing fields, operating
independent of one another. Only recently have rhetorical scholars begun to develop an
understanding of the connections between the two subjects. In this paper, I argue that not
only are mathematics and rhetoric intimately connected, but that mathematics is
necessarily rhetorical. I do so through an analysis of the foundations of mathematics in
the philosophical schools of logicism, intuitionism, and formalism using Burke’s pentad.
I then establish a method for analyzing mathematical artifacts based on the philosophical
foundation that they are founded upon.
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Introduction
Mathematics has long been used to persuade thinkers. Philosophical arguments
permeate the very establishment of modern mathematics in the Greek ideas of Aristotle
and Plato, who considered logic, geometry, and arithmetic. Before modern day
mathematicians could use now-universal Arabic symbols such as “1,” “0.5,” “-1,” and
even the Greek symbol of “π,” the very existence of natural numbers, fractions, negative
numbers, and irrational numbers was questioned throughout the ancient world. However,
there has been very little inquiry into the rhetorical nature of mathematics, and to some,
even to suggest that there exists a rhetoric of mathematics seems to suggest absurdity.
Despite these objections, I argue that mathematics is necessarily rhetorical. In this
paper, I seek to understand the rhetorical nature of mathematics by looking to its
foundation in philosophy. I consider three major schools of thought concerning
mathematical philosophy—logicism, intuitionism, and formalism, which will be defined
in great detail later on. In developing an understanding of the foundations of mathematics
as rhetorical, I hope to demonstrate that mathematics has a fundamentally rhetorical
nature, and I wish to explore that nature in great detail. The large and complex nature of
mathematics will be the primary limiting factor in this study, especially because there is
very little research on the rhetoric of mathematics. I will also be limited in that there are
naturally a large variety of important rhetorical questions about mathematics that should
be addressed more fully in future studies, but I will make a more comprehensive note of
these and other limitations towards the end of this paper.
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Defining Mathematics
To the general public, the nature of and reason for mathematics needs no
justification. Practical results of mathematics have been demonstrated consistently over
the past few centuries. Hardy argues, “The mass of mathematical truth is obvious and
imposing; its practical applications, the bridges and steam-engines and dynamos, obtrude
themselves on the dullest imagination. The public does not need to be convinced that
there is something in mathematics” (3). While the applications of mathematical truths are
indeed abundant, Hardy recognizes the lack of public understanding as to the true nature
and place of mathematics, “the popular reputation of mathematics is based largely on
ignorance and confusion” (Hardy 3). In order to establish any sort of rhetorical theory
that may be applied broadly to the field of mathematics, I must first establish what
mathematics is beyond the uninformed public opinion.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines mathematics as the “abstract science of
number, quantity, and space,” but this definition is inaccurate and imprecise when
measured against the understanding of mathematics held by most mathematicians. In
constructing a definition for a thing, one necessarily “mark[s] its boundaries” and defines
the thing in terms of what it is not (Burke 237). This is the paradox of substance, and
while most definitions cannot represent a thing better than the thing itself, I wish to
establish a rough idea of at least the realm in which mathematics exists for the purpose of
discussing its rhetoric. The OED definition of mathematics mentions two major
characteristics. First, mathematics is defined as an “abstract science,” and second,
mathematics deals with both quantity and space. As an abstract science, it is only recently
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that mathematics was even categorized with the scientific fields of study. Lockhart
remarks that:
The common perception seems to be that mathematicians are somehow connected
with science— perhaps they help the scientists with their formulas, or feed big
numbers into computers for some reason or other. There is no question that if the
world had to be divided into the “poetic dreamers” and the “rational thinkers” most
people would place mathematicians in the latter category. Nevertheless, the fact is
that there is nothing as dreamy and poetic, nothing as radical, subversive, and
psychedelic, as mathematics. (3)
Lockhart goes on to make the claim that mathematics is “not at all like science” though it
is “viewed by the culture as some sort of tool for science and technology” (4). It is true
that while many mathematical results may be applicable to the field of science,
mathematics itself is not reducible to a science, and to place mathematics within the
sciences constitutes a grave error in classification of the field. Just as the sciences may
feature and use the arts of communication, especially written communication, this does
not make communication itself a scientific field. But if not science, mathematics must
exist in some other realm of academia, and for Lockhart, that realm is the arts—“the first
thing to understand is that mathematics is an art” (Lockhart 3).
Lockhart is not alone in his view of mathematics having a more common
connection with the aesthetic and artistic side of academia. Hardy takes a similar point of
view: “The mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s must be beautiful;
the ideas like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is
the first test: there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics” (Hardy 14).
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The aesthetic value of mathematics has been consistently noted by prominent
mathematicians throughout history. In “The Study of Mathematics,” Betrand Russell
describes the aesthetics of mathematics:
Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty—a
beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our
weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely
pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show.
The mathematician Arthur Cayley remarked that “for a mathematical theory, beauty can
be perceived but not explained” (qtd. in Kaplan 97). There are few, if any,
mathematicians who do not at least acknowledge there is a place for aesthetics within the
field of mathematics.
As for the second dimension of the OED’s definition of mathematics—that
mathematics concerns itself with quantity and space—there are few who would deny that
mathematics indeed has means for describing quantity and space as concepts, but
mathematics itself is a more general study with more powerful tools than numbers alone.
Mathematics is interested in more general ideas than numbers, patterns, and relationships.
Lockhart calls mathematics “the art of explanation” (Lockhart 5). The art of mathematics
is not in the what (numbers, sets, theorems, axioms, definitions, etc.), but in the why
behind the what. Mathematics is concerned with the argument justifying the what—“It is
the argument itself which gives the truth its context, and determines what is really being
said and meant” (Lockhart 5).
While the OED definition may point towards features of mathematics, when
looking at the view of mathematicians themselves of their own subject, mathematics is
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not a science of numbers, quantity, and space, but an art of explanation for truths. It is
this that will be the definition for mathematics for the remainder of this paper. Thus, in
order to develop a more rigorous rhetoric of mathematics, one cannot view mathematics
from a scientific perspective, but one must instead look to the aesthetic foundations of
mathematics, and there is no purer foundation of mathematics to be found than that of the
philosophical schools of thought that dictate the very vision of mathematical thought. But
I now turn my attention to the body of existing research on the rhetoric of mathematics
before considering these philosophical foundations.
Rhetoric of Mathematics
While there has been little progress made in obtaining a broad understanding in
the area of rhetoric of mathematics, there is nonetheless a significant corpus of research,
primarily in the rhetoric of argumentation and the rhetoric of science, on mathematics.
While looking at mathematics from a scientific perspective may be problematic, as
mathematics is an art of explanation for truths than it is a science, mathematics does lend
itself to scientific ideas and techniques. For instance, mathematics, like science starts
with curiosity and exploration. Where a scientist would make empirical observations
about the natural world, a mathematician will often empirically check his ideas. For
example, if I claim that every natural number greater than two is the sum of two primes,
before proving the general result, I check specific cases (e.g. 5=2+3).
As in science, mathematics must necessarily begin with curiosity and experiment.
Therefore, there is a place for mathematics within the rhetoric of science, but only in the
sense that mathematics contains scientific features, and hence those features may be
analyzed as scientific, so long as one does not reduce mathematics to a science.
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Alternatively, science relies heavily on mathematical theory, and for this reason, rhetoric
of science should necessarily take mathematics into consideration. Rhetoric of science
should freely rely on mathematics in the study of science, but to reduce mathematics
simply to a rhetoric of science would be to remove the true essence of mathematics.
Argumentation
One of the major rhetorical areas that has been applied to mathematics is in
argumentation theory, much because one of the fundamental tools in mathematics is
proof, which necessarily requires argument and justification. Banegas and Alberdein
independently apply Stephen Toulmin’s model of argumentation to mathematics,
specifically to mathematical proof. The model is summarized as:
(1) The thesis or conclusion C proposed and criticized in a specific context; (2) the
data or reasons D supporting the thesis; (3) the warrant W connecting data and
thesis, legitimating the inference applied from D to C; (4) the backing B, available
to establish sound and acceptable warrants; and (5) the modal qualifier M
indicating the strength or the conditions of refutation R of the proposed thesis.
(Banegas 5)
Both Banegas and Alberdein argue that using this model for arguments—in both
formal proof and critical arguments about mathematics from the mathematics
community—mathematicians may find that they can expose the content of mathematical
argument more directly to criticism and debate. Banegas is not making the case for a less
formalized version of proof, but instead is advocating for the use of informal
argumentation theory to discover the “relevance, sufficiency and acceptability [of proof
and critical arguments within the mathematics community], which depend on the strength
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the warrant has from the data to the thesis that is to be established, and on their ability to
convince those participating in the debate” (Banegas 13). Therefore, Banegas espouses
the use of an additional perspective—in this case Toulmin’s—to the analysis of
mathematical argument, which in a field obsessed with precision and clarity is a
legitimate and relevant criticism.
On the other hand, Alberdein uses a more mathematically formal method in his
consideration of Toulmin’s model and believes the relevance of Toulmin’s models for
argument in proof will “[provide] sufficient room for substantive disagreement about
how to best reconstruct contentious proofs” and that “Toulmin’s layout may bring these
disagreements into sharper focus” (Alberdein 299). Nevertheless, the common trend is
that because proof is argumentative, models of argument may provide a means to
understanding the more rhetorical dimensions featured in proof.
However, some scholars in argumentation have made the claim that proof itself is
insufficient to be classified as argument. This brings forth a fair question that should be
posed: Is proof indeed an argument? If not, then argumentation would be an inadequate
setting for the analysis of mathematics rhetorically, at least in terms of mathematical
proof. The standard answer seems to be that proof may feature argument, but is not
necessarily an argument itself. Krabbe, in “Strategic Maneuvering in Mathematical
Proofs,” and Jackson, in her comments on Krabbe’s article, espouse the use of
argumentation theory in order to establish a better understanding of mathematical proof
from a rhetorical perspective. Both Krabbe and Jackson note that proof may be
persuasive, but claim that proofs are not always arguments. Krabbe holds that “whenever
in a proof the reasoning displays persuasive function, their persuasive effectiveness may
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depend on strategic maneuvering” (Krabbe 457). But what is the nature of argument and
what makes discourse argumentative? Jackson says, “argumentation has resolution of
disagreement as its characteristic purpose” (Jackson 471). In order to truly understand
whether proof satisfies this definition of argumentation, one must more fully understand
the nature of proof and mathematics in relation to mathematicians, which is one of the
fundamental questions this paper will seek to address.
The Rhetorical History of Mathematics
While there is some significant corpus of scholarly work on argumentation and
mathematics, there is little concerning the historical connections of mathematics and
rhetoric, but Reyes seeks to expose the true rhetorical nature in the development of
infinitesimals in his article “The Rhetoric in Mathematics: Newton, Leibniz, the Calculus,
and the Rhetorical Force of the Infinitesimal.” 1 Within this article, Reyes argues that the
infinitesimal “is a rhetorically constituted concept that influenced disciplinary practices
within and outside the field of mathematics” (Reyes 163). Reyes’s reasoning for why the
rhetoric generated by the infinitesimal is constitutive is that “there exists no means by
which to confirm or deny its existence. Rather, the infinitesimal finds its constitution in
the forms of rationality and intuitive logic that saturated late seventeenth-century
European mathematics” (163). Reyes approaches mathematics from a unique rhetorical
perspective, by admitting more work must be done in the philosophical side of
mathematics and accounting for this dimension of mathematics in his own paper.
However, Reyes, while incorporating the philosophy of mathematics into his
discussion and expanding understanding of a historical turning point for mathematics

1

Reyes also has written an excellent review of four major books on the rhetoric of mathematics. See
“Stranger Relations: The Case for Rebuilding Commonplaces Between Rhetoric and Mathematics.”
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from a rhetorical point of view, does not directly address the philosophical foundational
issues at work. It is this that is the purpose of this paper—to establish an understanding
of the rhetoric of mathematics by establishing an understanding of the rhetoric of the
philosophy of mathematics.
The Mathematics of Rhetoric
While mathematics has been analyzed by rhetorical scholars using the rhetoric of
argumentation, there have alos been some attempts to analyze rhetoric more carefully
from a mathematical point of view. For instance, in Rosenfeld’s “Set Theory: Key to the
Understanding of Kenneth Burke’s Use of the Term ‘Identification,’” Rosenfeld attempts
to apply the mathematical concept of set theory to the rhetorical concept of identification,
in order to establish a better understanding for identification.
In this article, Rosenfeld argues that to understand Kenneth Burke’s concept of
identification, it is necessary to consider identification from the perspective of
mathematical set theory. Rosenfeld claims that one needs an understanding of “more
exact usage of language employed by mathematics” (175). In this way, Rosenfeld
attempts to apply the mathematics from set theory to the rhetoric of Burke. Rosenfeld
claims that identification, in every case, must require the sharing of members of two sets;
disjoint sets do not permit identification, and two equal sets also do not allow
identification to occur. His final conclusion is that “Set Theory allows for a much broader
generalization because it shows identification to include any sharing done between sets”
(183). Rosenfeld does not, however, address the idea that mathematics may be rhetorical.
For example, set theory, developed by Cantor in the late 1800s, was subject to
doubt and criticism at the turn of the century. There is no one accepted system through
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which to view the idea of sets and to even define the word set leads to paradoxes such as
Russell’s Paradox, which for some mathematicians is not even seen as a true logical
paradox. Therefore, when Rosenfeld considers rhetoric through the eyes of set theory
without referring to a specific set theory (naïve set theory, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice, etc.), he is under the assumption
that a set theory sufficient for his argument has been established. However, in reality,
mathematicians themselves do not agree on one unified theory of sets, so by the very
outset of choosing a set theory, one engages in a rhetorical act. So to see identification as
set theoretical, one must first see set theory as rhetorical.
Rosenfeld is not alone is his study of how rhetoric makes use of mathematical
ideas. In Merriam’s “Words and Numbers: Mathematical Dimensions of Rhetoric,”
Merriam attempts to unpack how rhetoric is influenced by the persuasive appeal of
numbers, how numbers may influence the structure and style of messages, and the
numbers are used to give a name to a thing.
Merriam argues that numbers have a mystical appeal to the general public, “given
their inherent symbolic potency, numbers can produce persuasive effects by inducing
deeply imbedded connotations and beliefs” (Merriam 339). Merriam has a plethora of
examples of this mystic effect of numbers from religion to philosophy to politics to
advertising, but Merriam does not believe the persuasive power of numbers stems only
from their roots in society’s fascination with numbers, but also from “their extensive use
in naming our reality” (Merriam 343).
Merriam claims that numbers have a mnemonic quality from their simplicity and
clarity, and again, Merriam demonstrates this with an abundance of examples to support
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his point, from the way monarchs and leaders are named to the very use of numbers in
specifying a date. Furthermore, Merriam illustrates that for the English language at least,
the number three is a particularly popular rhetorical tool.
However, while Merriam does illustrate that numbers themselves contribute to
rhetoric, he is not engaging in a rhetoric of mathematics, and he is not demonstrating
rhetoric through a truly mathematical perspective. While it is true that mathematics
features numbers, and through the axioms of Peano, one may fully construct the natural
numbers, integers, and rationals, indication of a numeral is separate from the mathematics
of numbers. A numeral indicates notation of a number (e.g. 5 represents the idea of five),
but in using numerals to count one is not thinking mathematically, no more than one
thinks mathematically when one carries out the computation “1+1=2.”
In the words of C.J. Keyser, “Mathematics is no more the art of reckoning and
computation than architecture is the art of making bricks or hewing wood, … or the
science of anatomy the art of butchering” (qtd. in Kaplan 129). While it may be true that
when inhabiting a building one rests in a product of architecture, this is not an
architectural activity; and so it is with mathematics, that one may appeal to the results
that mathematics has provided, but one is hardly acting mathematical when she remarks
that the year is now 2015.
Much of the literature surrounding the rhetoric of mathematics omits a full
discussion of the nature of mathematics. In order to fully unpack the rhetoric of
mathematics accurately and precisely, the philosophical viewpoint of mathematics must
be fully realized and understood. Mathematics is rhetorical on the basis that mathematics
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is rooted in philosophy and the philosophy of mathematics has rhetorical features, which
I will examine further in this paper.
In order to truly appreciate the rhetorical nature of mathematics, one must view
mathematics first from its philosophical foundations and then as an art of explanation of
truth. In reducing mathematics to arguments, to science, or to numbers, one is not truly
engaging in a rhetoric of mathematics because that which one is analyzing is not
mathematical. To analyze the mathematical, I turn to its foundation: philosophy.
Axiomatic Theories within Mathematics
Mathematics is fundamentally composed of axiomatic systems. The axiomatic
methods employed in mathematics rely on accepting certain preliminary ideas from an
intuitive point of view, and such ideas are called primitives. For example, in set theory
the primitives of set and element of a set are accepted as the basis from which the theory
is built. The reason for this convention of accepting certain ideas intuitively is to avoid
an endless loop of definition. One could define a set as a collection, but then she must
define collection, one could define a collection as an accumulation, but then she must
define accumulation, and so on.
Once primitives have been accepted, one develops axioms, statements that are
accepted as true within the theory with no need for justification. The only justification of
the axioms necessary is metamathematical, a term coined by David Hilbert in the early
1900’s to describe the field of the study of mathematics using mathematical methods.
Metamathematics requires axioms of a particular theory of mathematics to be consistent
and independent. That is, axioms cannot inherently contradict the other axioms
(consistency) and axioms should not be derivable from other axioms (independence).
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Once primitives and axioms have been accepted, the primary goal of mathematics
is to prove theorems—new truths within a mathematical theory that have been derived
from the axioms. The means for demonstrating that a theorem is indeed derivable from
accepted truths is proof. But in order to establish a proof, mathematicians must have a
system of deduction and logic at their disposal. Thus, mathematics is intimately
connected with logic.
However, there is not one standard method of establishing this foundation on
logic. Mathematicians disagree on which axioms should be accepted and which should
be rejected. For example, not all mathematicians accept the Axiom of Choice in set
theory, which postulates that given a family (i.e., a set of sets) of disjoint non-empty sets
an element may be selected from each set to construct a new set. But this begs the
question of why mathematicians would not be able to decide, if mathematics is based on
logic, whether or not to accept or reject the Axiom of Choice. The answer to this
question lies in the rhetorical nature of axiomatic systems.
The most common axioms of set theory accepted by mathematicians are those
developed by Zermelo and Fraenkel. It has been shown through the results of Kurt Gödel
and Paul Cohen that the Axiom of Choice is independent of Zermelo and Fraenkel’s
axioms of set theory. That is, if the Axiom of Choice is taken to be true or false, the
consistency of Zermelo and Fraenkel’s axioms remains unchanged. This shows that the
Axiom of Choice is a statement within the language of set theory that can neither be
proven nor disproven. That is, there is no logical fallacy committed by accepting or
rejecting the Axiom of Choice. Thus, the subjective nature of mathematics reveals itself
most distinctly at the outset of the foundation of mathematics. But then one must address
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the question of what is the foundation of mathematics? From where does the foundation
of mathematics come? The answer to this question, in this paper, will be the foundation
of mathematics is rooted in the philosophy of mathematics.
Philosophy of Mathematics
There are three major philosophical schools of thought in the foundations of
mathematics—logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. Each was developed in the context
of the establishment of set theory by Georg Cantor in the late nineteenth century and the
mathematical crisis of the early twentieth century that ensued as a result of Cantor’s
work, where the very foundation of mathematics was called into question. The impetus
for the crisis of the twentieth century is largely due to the discovery of Bertrand Russell
of a paradox of set theory—Russell’s Paradox. This paradox comes from defining a
collection (recall that this is a set of sets), say S, such that a set A is an element of S, if A
is not an element of itself. The paradox comes in when the question, “is S an element of
S?” is posed. If S is an element of itself, then by definition, it is not a member of itself,
which is paradoxical. A more tangible demonstration of this paradox is “Joe is friends
with all people who are not friends with themselves.” If Joe is a friend to himself, then
he also is not a friend to himself, which is paradoxical.
For much of the early twentieth century, mathematicians struggled to resolve this
supposed paradox by developing the foundations of mathematics. One of the major
results of this effort was the publication of Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead’s
Principia Mathematica in three volumes from 1910-13, the ultimate goal of which was to
banish the paradoxes of Cantor’s set theory from mathematics by reducing mathematics
to logic. This was not the first attempt at such a program, as Gottlob Frege had much
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earlier began to develop a foundation for mathematics, based solely on logic in his 1879
work Begriffsschrift, and Russell communicated significantly with Frege over the course
of his career. For this reason, Frege and Russell are often seen as the founders of the
school of logicism within mathematical philosophy.
Logicism
The logicism philosophy maintains that mathematics is completely reducible to
logic. To ask a question of mathematics, for a logicist, is to ask a question of logic. But
what did the logicists mean by “logic”? According to Ernst Snapper, for a logicist, “a
logical proposition is a proposition which has complete generality and is true in virtue of
its form rather than its content” (208). That is, mathematical statements, from the logicist
perspective, must be true not because of what they say, but because of how they say it. If
you ask a logicist why an axiom is true, the response will be based on the form of the
axiom, not the content.
However, if one considers the Axiom of Choice aforementioned in the context of
Zermelo and Fraenkel’s set theory, she sees that the Axiom of Choice is not taken to be
true or false by mathematicians because of its form. Because the Axiom of Choice is
independent of the axioms developed by Zermelo and Fraenkel, the form of the Axiom of
Choice will not dictate whether or not to include it in set theory. Another example of
where this underlying principle of logicism fails is in the axiom of infinity within
Zermelo and Fraenkel’s set theory, which states that infinite sets exist. But why do some
mathematicians accept this axiom? It is largely due to familiarity with infinite sets, such
as the set of counting numbers (1, 2, 3, etc.). However, this is based on experience. One
can demonstrate the idea of infinite sets and for this reason, one accepts that infinite sets
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exist, but this reason is not based on the form of the axiom. Thus, the goal to reduce
mathematics to logic is one that cannot be fully realized (Snapper 207-208).
But if the logicist goal cannot be realized, why would one consider the philosophy
of logicism in the consideration of mathematics as rhetorical? It is because while
mathematics as a whole cannot be reduced to logic, often specific mathematical
statements may be reduced to logic. While the overall goal of logicism cannot be
achieved, logic is indispensable from mathematics because mathematics relies
significantly on logic in proof and deduction.
For example, while set theory may not be completely reducible to logic,
mathematicians who wish to study set theory in great detail must use logic to complete a
proof, especially if an implication is to be proved. If one wishes to show that a set A is a
subset of a set B, then one often appeals to the definition of subset—that for every
element x, if x is an element of set A, then x is also an element of set B. However, in
order to use this definition, the logical ideas of the universal quantifier (implicit in “every
element”), implication (implicit in “if x…then x…”), and how to prove statements of this
nature must be understood first using principles from logic. Mathematics thus uses logic
as a tool for persuasion, despite the fact that mathematics is not completely reducible to
logic.
Intuitionism
Like the school of logicism, the school of intuitionism was developed in response
to the paradoxes of set theory. The school was begun by Luitzen Brouwer, who saw the
paradoxes of set theory from a fundamentally different perspective than Frege and
Russell. While Frege and Russell believed the paradoxes of set theory were a result of an
error in execution of logic by mathematicians, and hence sought to dispose of the errors
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through proper reduction of mathematics to logic, Brouwer and the intuitionists believed
that the error was due to mathematics itself. For this reason, the intuitionist goal was to
rebuild mathematics. Brouwer derived the name of this school of thought from Kant’s
claim that humans have a natural understanding of time and are immediately aware of
time, and that this sense of immediate awareness is intuition (Snapper 210).
Thus, intuitionism is a philosophy based on the idea that mathematics is a mental
activity, not a set of theorems. There are few ideas in mathematics as intuitive as
counting, and for this reason, natural numbers are used as the basis for intuitionist
mathematical philosophy. One begins with the idea of one. From one, build two, and
from one and two build three. Thus, for any finite number, it is possible to begin with one
and build that number. This process is said to be both inductive and effective. It is
inductive in the sense that the process of building a number is not arbitrary. In order to
build the number 500, one must build the numbers that come before it. It is effective, in
that once a number has been built, the number has been constructed entirely and the
intuitionist can proceed to study it. It is only after building a mathematical object that
one can truly study it according to the intuitionist philosophy.
Thus, for the intuitionist mathematician, constructing a mathematical object
should mirror the construction of counting numbers in inductiveness and effectiveness.
According to Snapper, “[intuitionist] mathematics is the mental activity which consists in
carrying out constructs one after the other” (210). For intuitionists, mathematical ideas
that are not constructs in an inductive and effective sense are simply meaningless and
dismissed. Thus, the intuitionist school of thought completely eradicates contradictions
in mathematics, but because many results in mathematics cannot be constructed, there is
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a certain limitation to the possibility for abstraction. For example, the Axiom of Choice
is non-constructive. It postulates the existence of a set, but does not indicate how the set
is constructed. Hence, the Axiom of Choice is necessarily rejected by intuitionist
mathematicians; thus, mathematicians who accept the Axiom of Choice must necessarily
reject intuitionism.
In fact, the majority of the mathematical community rejects intuitionism for three
reasons—the proofs of intuitionist mathematics tend to be complex and lack elegance,
mathematicians refuse to reject many of the abstractions that intuitionism rejects, and
there are theorems which are true in classical mathematics and false from the point of
view of intuitionism. While all of these reasons have elements of art and aesthetic as
their basis, none of them demonstrate an inherent logical flaw in the intuitionist school of
thought. Thus, the rejection of intuitionism is purely subjective, but nonetheless
intuitionism does restrict mathematics from being an abstract study.
Formalism
The final philosophical school of mathematical thought that I will consider is
formalism. As with all the philosophies of mathematics considered, formalism was
developed in response to the crisis of paradoxes found in Cantor’s set theory in the early
twentieth century. It was developed by David Hilbert for the purpose of securing the
foundations of all mathematics by demonstrating that from a finite number of axioms all
mathematics can be built such that every statement can be written in precise
mathematical language, the axioms are consistent, the theory is complete (all statements
can be proven true or false by the axioms), and to find an algorithm for deciding the truth
or falsity of any statement in mathematics. The primary goal of formalism was to “create
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a mathematical technique by means of which one could prove that mathematics is free of
contradictions” (Snapper 214).
In order to carry out this program, formalists begin with an axiomatic theory and
developed the precise mathematical language to describe such a theory by specifying the
symbols and syntax for the axiomatic theory. Once the language for such a theory is
developed, the language can be analyzed for consistency. For example, to analyze the
counting numbers, one begins with the idea of one and assigns this idea the numeral “1.”
The same can be said of the idea of two, three, and so forth being assigned numerals “2,”
“3,” and so forth. Once these ideas have precise mathematical notation, any axioms
concerning them may be expressed in this notation, and so to analyze the theory of
counting numbers, it is enough to analyze the theory as it is expressed by this formal
language.
The formalist goal was ambitious and for many mathematicians the realization of
the formalist goal in its original form was demonstrated as impossible with the
publication of Kurt Gödel’s 1931 paper that proved any theory based on the axioms of
the counting numbers (Peano’s axioms) cannot be both consistent and complete. Thus,
starting from the natural numbers, one cannot construct a mathematical theory that
realizes the formalist goal.
Why, then, consider the formalist philosophy for mathematics if its original
purpose, like logicism’s purpose, can never be fully realized? Formalism still constructs
mathematical statements in a meaningful way by precisely demonstrating the language
behind mathematics. In studying the language of mathematics, the formalist does not
work so much with abstract entities or constructs of reality, but with the language itself.
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Mathematics for the formalist is viewed as a game, where the sentences in mathematics
may be manipulated according the syntactical rules of the game. Thus, formalism
benefits mathematics in that once the language is established, the analysis of mathematics
is a syntactical analysis of the language behind the mathematical ideas. Using this as the
formalist goal, there is a great deal of benefit to studying the rhetorical nature of
formalism.
The Rhetoric of Mathematical Philosophy
I now turn my attention to the primary purpose of this paper: to establish a
rhetorical theory of mathematics based upon mathematical philosophy. I have
established the three schools of mathematical thought in logicism, intuitionism, and
formalism. Logicism established deeper connections with logic and mathematics,
seeking to reduce mathematics to logic; intuitionism seeks to consider only entities that
may be inductively and effectively constructed (constructs); and formalism establishes a
precise language to express mathematical ideas and analyzes this language using
syntactical rules for manipulation of the language. However, because each of these
schools falls short in some area of importance to mathematicians—logicism failing to
completely reduce mathematical theories to logic, intuitionism being rejected for
damaging the aesthetic of simplicity that mathematicians have idealized, and formalism
falling short of completely formalizing every possible mathematical statement—the
foundation of mathematics is necessarily not a firm one.
Despite this, mathematics has continued to flourish and the persuasiveness of
mathematics is undeniable in the technological world. This is because mathematicians
concern themselves primarily with doing mathematics without concern for the
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foundations, though logic is present, constructs are desired, and formalization is
imperative for the modern mathematician. While a mathematician may not explicitly
adhere to a philosophical perspective, such perspectives have influenced mathematics.
From each philosophical perspective, a rhetoric is constructed. I now devote the
remainder of this paper to developing the rhetorical theory about each philosophy and
demonstrating how rhetorical constructs from each philosophy may be applied to specific
artifacts in mathematics.
Kenneth Burke’s Dramatistic Pentad
When mathematicians engage in discourse, they necessarily are subject to
rhetorical analysis because if their discourse is to hold any ground within the
mathematical community or to the general public, they must necessarily persuade.
Kenneth Burke developed the dramatistic pentad as not only a means for analyzing
discourse, in particular motives, but argued that the dramatistic pentad was a naturally
occurring component of human language. The pentad is not simply a device of analysis
that may be applied to discourse, but is necessarily implicit in language. Therefore, it
makes sense that in mathematics, the dramatistic pentad should reveal itself naturally.
From the very foundation of mathematics in any one of the three schools of
thought discussed thus far, the pentad is present and guides the discourse that takes place
from each perspective. I will uncover the precise pentadic structure underlying each
philosophical school of thought.
The pentad is composed of five major elements—act, scene, agent, agency, and
purpose. With each element of the pentad, there is associated a question: with act the
question is what, with scene the questions are where and when, with agent the question is

Shrontz 24
who, with agency the question is how, and with purpose the question is why. As soon as
any one of these elements has been specified, the others reveal themselves naturally. For
example, by specifying the scene of a university, one can immediately associate the agent
of students and professors engaging in the act of learning and teaching through the
agency of textbooks and classrooms for the purpose of education.
Burke also defined how the components of the pentad are related to one another
through the concept of ratios. For example, a specific scene may call for a certain type of
act, emphasizing a scene-act ratio. As in the example of the university, one may analyze
how the scene of a university necessarily calls for an academic act by considering the
relationship of the university to academic acts of research, teaching, learning, and so
forth.
Within the three philosophies, each specifies a component of the pentad. In
logicism, which has been associated with the philosophy of Platonic realism, the
mathematician is the means through which mathematics is discovered. Thus, logicism
casts mathematics as an agent and the mathematician as the agency through which
mathematics’ acts are revealed. In intuitionism, which has been associated with the
philosophy of conceptualism, the mathematician creates mathematics within the human
mind. Thus, intuitionism casts mathematics as an act done by the agent of the
mathematician in the scene of the mind. Finally, in formalism, which has been associated
with the philosophy of nominalism, the mathematician is an agent in the scene of
mathematics, where implicitly certain rules allow the mathematician to engage in certain
acts. When the scene of mathematics is changed, the rules change, allowing for different
types of acts.
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Logicism: Mathematics as Agent, Mathematicians as Agency
In logicism, the goal has primarily been to reduce mathematics to logic. In this
philosophical school of thought, mathematics is discovered by mathematicians, which
may at first seem like mathematicians are agents in an act of discovery of mathematics.
This would seem like a valid construction of logicism in terms of the pentad, if the
logicist philosophy was primarily concerned with the discovery of mathematics, but this
is not the primary goal of logicism. The premise of logicism is that mathematics is logic;
mathematics cannot act in any way that is not based in logic. Because of this,
mathematics must be seen as the agent by a logicist.
Mathematics is not an act that a logicist engages in because according to the
logicist philosophy, mathematics already exists independent of the mathematician.
Mathematics will continue to act even when humanity ceases to exist for the logicist. For
the logicist, mathematics is the agent, and mathematicians are the agency through which
mathematics acts. The role of the mathematician with respect to the agent of
mathematics is as an agency through which the acts of mathematics may be revealed.
Much like many scientists believe that they discover scientific principles acting in
the world, logicists believe they discover mathematics acting; but unlike scientific
principles, mathematical acts are not taking place in the world. For a logicist,
mathematical acts do not even occur within the human mind. Instead, logicists believe
mathematics exists in the scene of Plato’s realm of the forms as a perfectly logical agent
engaging in perfectly logical acts, which are revealed through the agency of
mathematicians.
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But then what is the purpose of mathematics for a logicist? Certainly, different
mathematicians could give a large array of reasons for the acts that the agent of
mathematics engages in, but for the true logicist, the purpose is subtle. For the true
logicist, the purpose of mathematics is to exist. In this way, mathematics is to a logicist,
as God is to some Christians: a mystery. If mathematics is a perfectly logical agent,
engaging in perfectly logical acts, in a perfect scene, for no purpose other than to exist,
and is revealed through human mathematicians, for the logicist, mathematics is God.
However, in constructing mathematics this way, there are some limitations to the
logicist point of view. Because the construction of mathematics by logicists is akin to the
construction of God as being an agent whose acts, agency, scene, and purpose are
mysterious, but perfect, a similar analysis applies to logicism as is applied to God by
certain constructions. The logicist construction of mathematics depicts mathematics as
existing in a perfect realm, and the motivation for the study of mathematics is dismissive
in the sense that the major questions of Burke’s pentad are answered ambiguously. The
logicist construction of mathematics is then subject to the same criticisms as the
dismissive construction of God. There is very little one can say about mathematics when
it is cast in such perfect light. If mathematics should seem to fail, then the blame must
necessarily fall upon the agency of mathematicians for imperfectly revealing the perfect
acts of the perfect agent of mathematics, who exists in the perfect realm of the forms.
To completely adopt this viewpoint would be problematic for several reasons.
First, this forces mathematics to be an intangible agent with perfect characteristics, which
is operatively is not the case. While it is admissible to claim that there is an ideal
mathematics, which human mathematicians should work towards, one should be careful
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when following this line of argument. If one casts mathematics as perfect, she must not
allow this to characterize mathematicians, who can and often do make mistakes. It is
easy to assume that just because a person is in the business of studying the divine, that
person by default has greater spiritual authority on matters what is true. To see this, one
need only look at corrupt members of the clergy. Some consider it surprising when
humans who study the divine act in a human manner, and so it is with mathematicians. If
one considers mathematics to be ideal, then she should be careful not to construct
mathematicians as free from error just because they reveal the truth of mathematics.
Second, casting mathematics as ideal is problematic because it creates unrealistic
expectations for mathematicians. If mathematics is ideal, then when a mathematician
makes an error, she has blasphemed against perfection. This is again analogous to the
clergy. If a priest was heard swearing by members of his congregation, many of those
members would be in shock and see it as a grave sin, even if those members themselves
swear in the privacy of their own home. So it is with mathematicians: if a mathematician
makes an error, despite the fact that the general public makes miscalculations on a daily
basis, the mathematician would be heavily admonished for his mistake. This is not to say
that mathematicians should not be criticized when an error is made; it is only to say that
to see a mathematical mistake as a sin against perfection is an exaggeration that unfairly
passes judgment on an imperfect mathematician.
Despite these shortcomings of the logicist construction of mathematics, there is
still some benefit to viewing mathematics through this perspective. It makes sense that
man, who according to Burke is “rotten with perfection” (70) would desire perfection
from mathematics, and there is nothing problematic about the viewpoint that there is an
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ideal mathematics that has yet to be achieved. So long as one make oneself aware that
humans are not perfect in revealing this ideal, this viewpoint is not a poisonous one. One
can then recognize where she should scrutinize the claims being made from this
viewpoint to avoid distortion.
The important ratio of the logicist philosophy is agent to agency. When a
particular artifact in mathematics constructs mathematicians as the agency by which acts
done by mathematics are revealed (i.e., mathematicians discover the acts of
mathematics), the logicist construction of the relationship between mathematics and
mathematicians is being employed. By identifying this, one can be more cognizant of
hyperbolic constructions of mathematicians as being free from error, admonishment of
mathematicians who have made mistakes, and construing mathematics as perfect.
Intuitionism: Mathematics as Act, Mathematicians as Agents
The goal of intuitionism is to construct all of mathematics effectively and
inductively. In this sense, mathematicians act as agents who do the act of mathematics.
This inherently casts mathematicians as more active, since they are creating mathematics
from the ground up. This then begs the question: what other elements of the pentad are at
play here? For the agency, as the mathematician is the agent who performs the act of
mathematics, the means must also belong to the mathematician. Whether the
mathematician considers the precise means to be a technique constructed in the mind or
the mind itself, the agency is contained within the agent. Because all of mathematics
must be constructed by the mathematician according to the intuitionist philosophy, the
mathematician must have the means within himself.
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In a sense, this is a very humanist perspective in that it places humanity as the
creator of mathematics. If humans are the creators of the tools of mathematics, one
cannot construe mathematics as some perfect gift given by gods or the universe. The
successes of mathematics and its applications are then a result of humanity’s greatness;
however, one must acknowledge that if mathematics fails, it is the result of humanity’s
failure to properly construct mathematics. This places all blame and all reward on the
mathematician for the act of mathematics.
The scene and purpose of mathematics is more difficult to determine for an
intuitionist. Because it is mathematicians that engage in the act of mathematics, the scene
may vary depending on the mathematician. If the mathematician sees the beauty of his
work in the practical results, one could say the scene lies within the applications
themselves. Feats of engineering and science due to the influence of mathematics may be
the scene for the mathematician who sees his purpose as to advance science and
technology with acts of mathematics. Likewise, if the mathematician sees the purpose of
mathematics as aesthetical, then the scene may be the mathematical proof, for in a simple
proof, a mathematician has engaged in a mathematical act to create something
aesthetically appealing.
In this way, the mathematical philosophy of intuitionism has an individualistic
construction when using the pentad to build this particular perspective. The scene and
purpose of mathematics depend on the individual engaging in the act of mathematics,
which makes sense because mathematicians are individuals.
But what are the implications of this intuitionist philosophy? There are several
problems that arise in considering the relationship of the mathematician to mathematics
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as an agent to an act, and it is common for mathematicians and the general public to
construct the relationship in this way. A mathematician does mathematics (though few
understand what this actually means). However, in constructing a mathematician as an
agent to an act, mathematics becomes a conscious effort of the mind to create, but if this
is the case, then how does one account for the darker side of quantitative results, such as
the creation of the atomic bomb? How does one account for mathematicians working on
problems for the National Security Agency that aid in obtaining information on the
private lives of American citizens? How does one account for mathematicians aiding the
Department of Defense in the development of weapons to be used on humans of other
cultures? If the intuitionist philosophy is taken literally, if mathematicians are agents
acting in mathematics, then the acts of mathematicians can be constructed as immoral.
By engaging in a field where curiosity and learning are upheld, a mathematician may be
to blame for an act of violence caused by a mathematical act, even though a
mathematician’s purpose was understanding and creation of something beautiful.
Thus, one should be careful when using the intuitionist perspective to realize that
mathematics may not necessarily be an act of violence. Of the same token, if a
mathematician consciously and actively works on a problem for the purpose of initiating
an act of violence, would a mathematician not share some of the blame for the violence?
To an extent, one may blame a mathematician for intentionally engaging in an act that
aided violence and the intuitionist perspective helps to see this, but one should be aware
that blaming a mathematician for how her work is being used by others may be unfair.
Similarly, one should not diminish the contributions of scientists and engineers
when a mathematician contributes constructively through mathematics by improving
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quality of life through the application of a mathematical theory. While mathematicians,
by the intuitionist construction, may create the mathematical act necessary for
technological advances to occur, one should not allow her view to be so individualized on
the subject of mathematics that she forgets that mathematicians and other researchers
often stand on the shoulders of giants. The effort for progress is a collective one, and by
constructing mathematicians as agents and mathematics as act, one runs the risk of
forgetting that progress is not achieved with one act by one person.
The important ratio of the intuitionist philosophy is agent to act. When a
particular artifact in mathematics constructs mathematicians as the agent who does the act
of mathematics (i.e., mathematicians create the acts of mathematics), the intuitionist
construction of the relationship between mathematics and mathematicians is being
employed. By identifying this, one can scrutinize where credit and blame are being taken
and given to and from mathematicians and other people, especially concerning
technological advancements related to mathematics.
Formalism: Mathematics as Scene, Mathematicians as Agents
While the goals of formalism were initially very ambitious (axiomatically
describing mathematics so that it is complete, all true statements are provable, and there
are no contradictions), the spirit of formalism was more attainable. Formalism casts
mathematics as an abstract system that should be studied using language. In order to
study mathematics, a context must be precisely defined so that the language and syntax of
the language is clear. Once this has been achieved, mathematics is reduced to the study
of the context. For this reason, formalists construct mathematics as a scene, but what is
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the role of mathematicians? For formalists, mathematicians are playing a game in the
scene of mathematics.
In this sense, mathematicians remain agents, but the acts are syntactical acts that
depend on the scene of mathematics. When the scene is changed (i.e., modify a
definition or axiom), then the permissible acts are also changed, but mathematics remains
fixed in the sense that mathematics is a fluid subject. Just as a university is still a
university when it has its core components (professors and students), so is mathematics
still mathematics when the rules of the game are changed.
The agency for mathematicians in formalism is metamathematics.
Metamathematics allows mathematicians to talk about what may be done within a
particular theory of mathematics. Metamathematics is the means through which
mathematicians engage in mathematical acts. One may see these as global rules
governing the scene of mathematics. No matter how the scene of mathematics changes,
metamathematics dictates for formalists how syntax may be manipulated within a local
theory.
For example, if a mathematician accepts the Axiom of Choice in his rules, he may
use this in a proof, but if a mathematician rejects the Axiom of Choice in his rules, he
may not use this in a proof. The agency which permits and prevents the act of using the
axiom of choice is metamathematical—in order to use an axiom it must be a part of the
theory. Requiring that an axiom be part of a theory to permit a syntactic act on it is a
global rule, no matter what theory the mathematician is acting in, he must use appropriate
metamathematical means.
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As with the other philosophies, I now consider what the purpose for this particular
construction of mathematics and mathematicians is. For formalists, the purpose of
mathematics is to analyze the structure of mathematical theory through a particular
perspective (scene). This is much like Burke’s perspective by incongruity.2 By
consistently changing the scene of mathematics, the mathematician creates multiple
perspectives, thus maximizing the true understanding of the subject.
Formalism is the most frequently employed philosophy of modern
mathematicians, and for this reason, there are few downsides to formalism. Because
formalism seeks to understand mathematics by considering it from a given context, it is a
very versatile style of communicating mathematically. The benefits of this have been
demonstrated through very complicated results in one context being proven in a different
context, such as Fermat’s Little Theorem in Number Theory being proven using tools
developed in Group Theory.
There is some caution in the formalist perspective. Because in formalism a
language and context must be specified, there is a danger of creating hierarchy of
theories, and humans are “goaded by a spirit of hierarchy” according to Burke (70).
Thus, formalists should be wary of classifying the particular scene they have chosen to
place their problems as superior to that of other mathematicians. By being flexible and
allowing for other scenes and perspectives, instead of attempting to classify, formalists
may make more progress towards understanding and answering key questions.
The important ratio of the formalist philosophy is scene to agent. When a
particular artifact in mathematics constructs mathematicians as the agent by whom acts
are done in the context of particular ideas or assumptions (i.e., mathematicians act in a
2

See Burke “Perspective by Incongruity: Comic Correctives.”
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context of mathematics), one finds that the formalist construction of the relationship
between mathematics and mathematicians is being employed. By identifying this, one
can be cautious of hierarchical structures being established, and hope for more flexible
perspectives on the subject at hand.
Conclusion: Rhetorical Perspectives on Mathematics
In understanding the construction of mathematics through pentadic analysis, one
can view each of the philosophical schools of thought as offering a different rhetorical
perspective on mathematics. While I have done so in this paper using Kenneth Burke’s
pentad, one may use many of the other rhetorical tools at her disposal to further explore
these relationships. For example, Burke’s theory on order and hierarchy applies directly
to each of the three philosophies. Each philosophy creates guilt when mathematics
contains seemingly contradictory ideas (falsities), where logicism places blame on
mathematicians, intuitionism places blame on mathematics, and formalism places blame
on the language used to describe mathematics. However, I do not wish to explore the
many other rhetorical perspectives that can be applied to each of these philosophies at
this time, but to create a general methodology around mathematics such that mathematics
may be analyzed more carefully in a rhetorically meaningful way.
In analyzing mathematics from its foundations, the philosophy (or philosophies)
underlying the work should be chosen. In its current state, mathematics relies primarily
on the philosophies of logicism, intuitionism, and formalism, but as more work is done in
the foundations of mathematics, this foundation may again shift. The major theme of the
philosophy (or philosophies) at play should be identified. In the pentadic analysis above,
I chose to analyze mathematics from the logicist, intuitionist, and formalist philosophies.
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I identified the key themes: mathematics is reducible to logic and exists in a perfect
realm, imperfectly described by mathematicians (logicism); mathematics is constructed
and mathematical objects must be constructed inductively and effectively before they can
be studied (intuitionism); mathematics must be given a context in language and should be
studied in that context by studying the syntax of the language (formalism). Once the
major themes of the mathematical philosophies have been identified, one may apply a
rhetorical theory to the philosophies themselves, or more applicably to an artifact that
demonstrates these philosophies.
But what constitutes an artifact that would demonstrate these philosophies? The
most basic would be a proof. A proof may be analyzed for its foundation in logic, its
foundation in clear constructions, and foundation in language and syntax. In this sense,
an artifact may demonstrate more than one philosophical theme, and when one analyzes
the proof rhetorically, one should acknowledge how where these themes come together
and where they part.
For instance, if in a proof an object has been constructed, a mathematician may
then use the logical principle of reductio ad absurdum (proof by contradiction) to
demonstrate that the constructed object may not have a certain property. In this case, the
proof would have both intuitionist and logicist themes. One could then analyze the
rhetorical elements, such as the mathematician as a creator (intuitionist construction of
agent), or the contradiction creating an imperfection, whereby the mathematician is
forced to cast out the imperfect statements in his revelation of mathematics through proof
(logicist construction of mathematics as a perfect agent and mathematician as the
imperfect agency).
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Additionally, new philosophical perspectives may be generated by permuting the
ratios of the pentad. For example, if one constructs mathematicians as the scene and
mathematics as an act, one creates a new perspective of mathematics being something
done within mathematicians. One could mean that mathematicians are metaphorically
the scene (in the sense that mathematics may be done in the mind) or that mathematicians
are literally the scene (in the sense that mathematicians like Hardy often suffer physically
from having mathematics done in them). The new perspectives will have new themes
contained within them, and can be rhetorically analyzed much like the three philosophies
I have already discussed, using an appropriate rhetorical theory. By starting from the
foundations of mathematics in philosophy, rhetorical scholars may still develop
meaningful analyses of the rhetoric of mathematics, and when they analyze in this way,
their results can be applied more generally because rhetorical scholars then acknowledge
the common ties that mathematical artifacts have with one another.
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